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We study the economic relationship between globalization and inequality within a country. In a partial equilibrium it is 
shown even when the local government exclusively maximizes the welfare of the marginalized (unemployed) people, 
relative consumption inequality between employed and the marginalized always rises by intensified globalization. 
However in certain situations the relative income inequality may fall. 
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A recent study by IMF (2007) unusually admits, the observations made by
economists over the years that the globalization has increased income in-
equalities both between the countries and within the countries, have some
credence. Since these observations defy the predictions of the standard trade
models, a body of theoretical literature has developed to explain and dis-
cuss these observations, see for example, Basu (1997), Rodrik (1997), Cohen
(2006), Feenstra (2006), Jomo and Baudot (2007), OECD (2008) to name
just a few.
It is well recognized in international economics that trade policies may
bring about welfare improvement for the nation as a whole, it usually fails to
construct a Pareto improvement. However, it is also apprehended that the
government can make the Pareto improvement a reality by taxing the gainers
and transfering the proceeds to the marginalized, see for example Broll et
al. (2001), Basu (2006), Dehesa (2006), Elbers et al. (2008), Aslund and
Dabrowski (2008).
What is the eect of such redistributive policies on inequality within the
nation? While very few theoretical papers predict the outcome, the empirical
papers overwhelmingly reports the worsening of the income inequality.1 The
one obvious explanation for these ndings is that the government for various
reasons fails to take care of the marginalizeds.
In this paper, however, we do not consider the case of a government
failure. In contrast, we consider a government, which redistributes by ex-
cusively maximizing the welfare of the marginalizeds without any failure of
its policies. We ask the same question as before: does globalization worsen
income inequality within the nation? Interestingly, we nd out that intensi-
ed international trade and globalization even with such an extremely pro-
marginalized government the rise in the consumption inequality can not be
prevented, while the income inequality may fall. The precise condition for
1See, for example, Sen (1999), Sachs (2005), Jomo and Baudot (2007), IMF (2007),
OECD (2008).
2the rise or the fall of income inequality can be shown. Furthermore we also
demonstrate the way optimum tax rate in a linear income tax system may be
in
uenced either by the tari rate or the share of tari revenue redistributed
to the unemployed.
How do we then reconcile these striking theoretical predictions of our pa-
per with the empirical ndings? The answer solves a long-standing puzzle.
The fact is, in most of the countries, specially in the developing countries
with large informal sectors, the income inequalities are measured with con-
sumption data as the specic income data are not available. Therefore, it
is not surprising that the empirical literature nds that the income inequal-
ity rising with globalization within these nations, while the truth can be
something else as we apprehend in this paper. However, this paper works
out a simple formula applying which the income inequality can be caculated
from the consumption inequality. Applied to the real life data, it certainly
promises to change the way the empirical studies look at the data to nd the
relation between globalization and inequality within a country.
Our study proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a partial equilibrium
model of a country having its population separated between into two homo-
geneous groups of people: employed and unemployed (or marginalized). The
unemployed are supported mainly by the income tax imposed on the income
of employed people, which is supplemented by the tari revenue. The tari
revenue is collected from the import of the commodity that is exclusively
consumed by the employed consumers. Given the tari rate and the tax
rate, we derive the equilibrium levels of income and consumption of the two
groups. Section 3 demonstrates the relationship between globalization, in-
equality within a nation and the welfare program for the marginalized. The
main results are derived and discussed. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The model
The paper studies the interaction of the globalization policy and the welfare
program for the marginalized on the inequality within the nation. Therefore
we consider a small open economy. The population of the economy is di-
vided between two dierent groups of people: marginalized, i.e., unemployed
and non marginalized, i.e. employed people. We denote the number of em-
ployed and nonemployed as e and n, respectively. Labor is the only factor
3of production in the economy. In order to support the unemployed popula-
tion, the national government of the country runs a redistribution program
which taxes the income of the employed and transfers the proceeds to the
marginalized. Income tax is proportional at the rate t 2 (0;1).
In addition to the income tax, the government has another source of
revenue that comes from the imposition of a tari on the imported goods.
The tari revenue is exclusively collected from the employed people as they
are the only one to consume the imported commodity. But, like the tax
revenue the government does not necessarily redistribute the entire amount
of tari revenue to the unemployed. It redistributes a proportion 
 of the
tari revenue to the unemployed and 1   
 to the employed, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that the economy imports only one commodity and
exports a dierent good. Within the economy a non-traded good is produced.
While the exported commodity is not consumed within the economy, the non-
traded commodity is consumed exclusively by the unemployed people.
The tari inclusive price of the imported commodity is p + , when p
is the international price of the commodity and  is the specic tari rate.
We assume  < p. The economy being small in the international trade
environment can not control p. It can neither control the value of , which is
determined as part of international negotiations on liberalization trade. We
use  as an index of the extent of globalization of the country. The lower the
value of  is, the more globalized is the economy.
Suppose c is the consumption of the imported commodity by the repre-
sentative employed individual; w is her wage rate and l is her consumption
of leisure. The wage rate w() is a decreasing function of tari rate . As
 falls, the employed individual produces more of the exported commodity
in which her productivity is higher and which has higher price at the world
market. Therefore, w rises. We note this as a separate assumption of the
model.
Assumption (A.1) dw()=d < 0.
We can write the budget constraint of the representative employed indi-
vidual as
(p + )c = w()(1   t)(T   l) + (1   
)c;
where T is the endowment of time and l denotes leisure. The budget equation
4can be rewritten as
(p + 
)c = w()(1   t)(T   l): (1)
For the employed individuals we assume a utility function
u(c;l) = 2c
1=2 + l:
The representative employed individual maximizes u(c;l) by choosing appro-
priate values of (c;l) such that the budget equation (1) is satised. Assuming
interior solution, (c;l) solve the decision problem of the household.



































The per capita tari revenue transfer, denoted by Se, to the employed is





Since the marginalized population does not earn from labor supply, the
only source of income for a representative unemployed individual is the trans-
fer received from the government given by Sn in equation (5). If y represents
the per capita income of the unemployed it must be y = Sn.
5On the other hand, the per capita income of the employed, from the labor
supply as well as from the possible government transfer, turns out to be
Y = w()(1   t)(T   l
) + Se: (7)
Now, consider a representative unemployed individual. The price of the
non-traded commodity she consumes is pn. Observe, pn() is a decreasing
function of the tari rate . This is implied by assumption (A.1). Since the
employed labor also produces the non-traded commodity, as  falls and con-
sequently w() rises, pn() also rises.We note this separately in the following
Assumption (A.2) dpn()=d < 0.
We can write the income constraint of the representative unemployed





The utility function of the representative unemployed individual takes the
following form by assumption
V (cn) = 2c
1=2
n + T:
On substitution of the value of cn we nd out the indirect utility function of








Now we are ready to discuss the relationship between globalization, in-
equality in income and consumption. The aim of the model is to study the
possibility of a welfare program for the marginalized in this economy in the
following section.
3. Globalization, tax policy and inequality
The objective of our study is to analyze the interaction between globalization,
relative inequality in income and consumption for the marginalized people.
2In the following we eliminate the exogenous variable T.
6We ask questions about the eectiveness of domestic policy instruments in
favour of the marginalized. It is assumed that the domestic government is
maximizing exclusively the welfare of the marginalized people. The policy
instrument is the tax rate. To facilitate the analysis in the following we use
the indirect utility function of the marginalized, i.e. unemployed people.
3.1 Tax policy
For any given 
 and  the government maximizes the utility function of the
unemployed V  by choosing an appropriate value of tax rate t.
V
(;







We summarize our rst ndings as follows.
Proposition 1 (tax policy and redistribution) (a) If 
 > 0, then t =
1=2   
=2p. As  decreases t increases. (b) If 
 = 0, then t = 1=2. As 
decreases t does not change.










p) = 0: (11)
The solution to the welfare maximization problem is represented by t. Note
that the sign of equation (11) depends on the sign of (p   
   2tp). This
term is a monotonically decreasing function of t. As t goes to zero, it attains
(p   
), which is positive owing to the assumptions  < p and 
 2 [0;1].
On the other hand, it achieves  (
 + p) < 0 as t goes to 1.
Therefore, there exists a value of the tax rate t 2 (0;1) for which (10)
is maximized. The value of income tax rate, which represents the interior





The economic intuition behind our rst result is as follows. Given the
values of 
 and  as the government's objective is to maximize the welfare of
the marginalized, it chooses the tax rate in such a way that it maximizes the
per capita transfer to the unemployed. As it chooses the higher value of the
tax rate, given that the representative employed individual does not change
7her labor supply, it earns a higher amount of revenue. But, since for the
employed person, as the tax rate goes up and her post tax wage rate falls,
the substitution eect dominates the income eect. Therefore she reduces
her labor supply. Consequently, her income and the tax revenue falls.
The government while choosing the optimum tax rate balances between
these two countervailing forces of the marginal benet and the marginal cost.
It settles at the tax rate t = 1=2   
=2p < 1: If 
 increases, the employed
receive a lower share of the tari revenue. Therefore, it acts as an additional
tax on the employed persons. It is evident from equation (2) that the increase
in the value of 
 feeds into the substitution eect further, to reduce the supply
of labor from the employed persons. So, the marginal cost from choosing the
higher tax rate gets magnied. Therefore, as 
 increases the government
chooses a lower value of t. If 
 = 0, it chooses the highest optimal possible
value of the tax rate which is t = 1=2.
Observe, from equation (2) again, given 
 > 0, the value of the tari
rate  also in
uences the choice of t exactly in the same way as 
. As 
increases the consumption of imports of the employed people becomes more
costly. So, it feeds in the substitution eect to reduce further the supply of
labor due to taxation. Like 
, it also magnies the marginal cost of choosing
the higher value of the tax rate for the government. However, the opposite
happens if the value of  falls. Given 
 > 0, the marginal cost of choosing
the higher tax rate for the government falls for given marginal benet. It
chooses a higher tax rate.
Globalization provides the domestic government the opportunity to in-
crease the tax rate to maximize the welfare of the marginalized of the econ-
omy. Note if 
 = 0, this eect does not work. In this situation, the gov-
ernment redistributes the entire amount of tari revenue to the employed
persons only. Therefore, the change in tari rate no longer in
uences the
marginal cost of taxation. The government keeps the tax rate unchanged
even if the tari rate falls as the economy becomes more integrated in the
global market.3
3For dierent types of tax policies see Kemnitz (2006), Marjit et al. (2006), Kreicke-
meier and Raimondos-Moller (2008).
83.2 Consumption and income inequalities
Now we explore the eect of globalization on relative income and consump-
tion inequality in the economy. We denote Rc as the ratio of equilibrium
consumption of both groups, Rc = c
e=c
n. Furthermore, we dene Ry as the
ratio of income of employed and the marginalized in equilibrium, Ry = Y =y.
The value of Rc denes the relative extent of consumption inequality in the
economy. The higher value of Rc stands for the relative higher inequality in
the economy. Similarly, Ry stands for higher relative income inequality in
the economy.
As we substitute the values of t in equations (2) and (8) we obtain
the equilibrium values of per capita consumption, c and c




















Using equation (12) and the value of Ry in equation (13) the income ratio
can be rewritten as
Ry = Rc(p + ): (14)
Now we are in a position to examine how the inequalities in relative income
and consumption, Ry and Rc, change as globalization increases, i.e. the tari
rate  decreases.
Proposition 2 (income and consumption inequality) (a) As globalization in-
creases, inequality in consumption, Rc, rises. (b) As globalization increases,
income inequality Ry rises if and only if  > =(p + ), where  is the elas-
ticity of the non-traded commodity price pn with respect to the tari rate.
Otherwise relative income inequality, Ry, remains constant.



















9Note by assumption (A.2) dpn=d < 0. If 
 = 0, Proposition 1 implies













 > 0, Proposition 1 implies dt=d =  
=2p. Substituting this value of













The statement of the rst part of the claim follows.
(b) From equation (14) we obtain
dRy
d




Substituting the value of Rc from equation (12) and the value of dRc=d from
















From equation (17) the claim of the second part of Proposition 2 follows.
Q.E.D.
Inspection of Proposition 2 leads us to the following result. As the econ-
omy is more globalized, induced by an exogenous reduction in the tari rate
and an induced increase in international trade, the consumption inequality
within the economy rises even if the government focuses exclusively on the
maximization of the welfare of the marginalized. But, it also shows, depend-
ing on the elasticity of the non-traded commodity price pn with respect to
the tari rate, , as the economy is more globalized, it may well be the case
that the income inequality within the economy falls. As a consequence of
more globalization, which means a decrease in the value of , if the price
of the non-traded commodity, which is consumed by the unemployed only
does not rise too much, i.e. if the value of  is fairly low, then Proposition 2
predicts a fall in income inequality. We note this observation separately.
10Corollary Suppose the economy is going to be more globalized. When the
government exclusively maximizes the welfare of the marginalized people in
the economy, although the relative consumption inequality always rises, in
certain situations the relative income inequality may fall.
4. Concluding remarks
Has globalization led to a greater inequality or less inequality within nations
and within nations? A new IMF research (2007), contained in the fund's
semiannual economic review, the World Economic Outlook, conrms that the
work of other economists, who have been trying to gure out why income
inequality has widened in both rich and poor countries over the past two
decades. The report is an unusal admission by the IMF of the downsides of
globalization.
In a partial equilibrium framework this paper has discussed the rela-
tionship between an increase in globalization and relative income and con-
sumption inequality within a country. If the economy is going to be more
globalized and when the government exclusively maximizes the welfare of
the marginalized people in the economy, although the consumption inequal-
ity always rises, in certain situations the income inequality may fall. As a
consequence of more globlization, which means a decrease in the tari rate,
if the price of the non-traded commodity, which is consumed by the unem-
ployed only does not rise too much, i.e., if the price elasticity is fairly low,
then the model predicts a fall in income inequality.
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